Discussion Title: Are tracking apps a legitimate and proportional means to fight COVID-19?

1. Tracking apps are legitimate and proportional means to fight COVID-19.
1.1. Con: The effectiveness of tracking apps in preventing the spread of COVID-19 is not proven.
1.1.1. Pro: Tracking apps have a high chance of getting false negatives and positives.
1.1.1.1. Pro: Tracking apps won't be aware of any [extenuating circumstances](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/05/me_on_covad-19_.html), like walls or partitions.
1.1.1.1.1. Con: Bluetooth is dulled by [walls](https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-strengths-weaknesses/), and so it does offer a good proxy of whether one is sharing an airspace with someone else.
1.1.1.2. Pro: Not [every contact](https://www.clickorlando.com/news/local/2020/07/06/heres-how-likely-you-are-to-get-infected-if-youre-exposed-to-covid-19/) results in transmission; the disease has a transmission rate that's less than 100%.
1.1.1.3. Pro: Not every transmission is a result of that precisely defined contact - the virus sometimes [travels further](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/05/me_on_covad-19_.html).
1.1.1.4. Pro: If tracing apps were to be effective in detecting close contacts with infected people, one walk in a busy street could generate many alerts, increasing constant anxiety without meaningful results.
1.1.1.4.1. Con: Tracing apps consider the proximity and duration of a contact to assess whether it poses a relevant risk for virus transmission. Simply passing by a person wouldn't qualify for this. \([See the section "Which criteria are used to assess potential exposures, and what are the different recommendations for action?"](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/corona-warn-app/corona-warn-app-englisch/corona-warn-app-faq-1758636#toggledown-content-8)\)
1.1.1.5. Pro: People may be infected by [respiratory droplets](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/20/what-it-means-to-come-into-close-contact-with-a-coronavirus-case.html) of infected persons that are left behind on surfaces. Tracing apps will not be able to account for this mode of transmission.
1.1.2. Con: Countries using tracking apps claim it helps them [isolate](https://www.businessinsider.com/countries-tracking-citizens-phones-coronavirus-2020-3) the spread of the virus.
1.1.2.1. Con: Tracking applications are ineffective in isolation if they are not complemented by restrictive government measures to stop the spread of the virus.
1.1.2.1.1. Pro: Countries who claim it works \(like China and India\) also have [restrictive measures](https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2020/05/10/straks-kom-je-in-india-nergens-meer-binnen-zonder-corona-app-a3999258) for those who do not use the app.
1.1.3. Pro: Tracking apps are incapable of establishing human contact reliably.
1.1.3.1. Pro: The estimated adoption rate for apps to be effective is [60%](https://hbr.org/2020/07/how-to-get-people-to-actually-use-contact-tracing-apps). This is never reachable with voluntary adoption.
1.1.3.1.1. Pro: People may assume that it is [inconsequential](https://www.brinknews.com/why-wont-people-use-contact-tracing-apps/) whether an individual installs an app or not.
1.1.3.1.2. Con: While high coverage is preferable, even with lower numbers, a [reduction](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/05/1002775/covid-apps-effective-at-less-than-60-percent-download/) in the number of coronavirus cases and deaths is expected.
1.1.3.1.3. Pro: Voluntary adoption rates of tracking apps are low in many countries. No country has exceed an adoption rate of [50%](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ATalASO8KtZMx__zJREoOvFh0nmB-sAqJ1-CjVRSCOw/edit#gid=0).
1.1.3.1.3.1. Pro: Cyprus's tracking app only has an adoption rate of less than [0.8%](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ATalASO8KtZMx__zJREoOvFh0nmB-sAqJ1-CjVRSCOw/edit#gid=0).
1.1.3.1.3.2. Pro: In Poland, the voluntary adoption rate of the tracking app is [1.9%](https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/09/11/uptake-of-covid-contact-tracing-app-under-2-in-poland-among-the-lowest-rates-in-europe/).
1.1.3.1.3.3. Con: Just because voluntary adoption rates are not high right now does not mean they could not be higher in the future.
1.1.3.1.3.3.1. Con: Tracking apps have been available to download since [before April](https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/behind-global-efforts-make-privacy-first-coronavirus-tracking-app-n1177871), and yet, [no country](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ATalASO8KtZMx__zJREoOvFh0nmB-sAqJ1-CjVRSCOw/edit#gid=0) has been able to surpass the threshold through voluntary adoption.
1.1.3.2. Pro: Most tracking apps use Bluetooth to assess the risk of a transmission, which is fundamentally limited in its accuracy in detecting relevant contacts.
1.1.3.2.1. Pro: Bluetooth has [too great a range](https://www.scienceabc.com/innovation/what-is-the-range-of-bluetooth-and-how-can-it-be-extended.html) to detect reliably who was close enough to you.
1.1.3.2.1.1. Con: Bluetooth-based tracking apps do not only rely on signal presence to establish whether a contact relevant for transmission has occurred, but also [consider the signal strength to assess the proximity](https://medium.com/personaldata-io/inferring-distance-from-bluetooth-signal-strength-a-deep-dive-fe7badc2bb6d).
1.1.3.2.1.1.1. Con: There are many factors that influence bluetooth signal strength that tracking apps cannot take into account when determining the estimated distance.
1.1.3.2.1.1.1.1. Pro: [The presence of a wall between the devices influences the signal strength](https://www.techwalla.com/articles/what-are-the-limitations-of-bluetooth).
1.1.3.2.1.1.1.1.1. Pro: [Bluetooth.com](https://www.bluetooth.com/blog/3-common-mythsabout-bluetooth/) states that "\[Concrete walls\] will have an impact on the overall range of the signal, but they don’t block it."
1.1.3.2.1.1.1.1.2. Con: The presence of a wall means that there is enough material between an infected person and the person behind the wall that they do not need to be notified of any risk.
1.1.3.2.1.1.1.2. Pro: [Different phones have different bluetooth-transmitters with varying strength](https://github.com/opentrace-community/opentrace-calibration/blob/master/Trial%20Methodologies.md#anechoic-chamber-readings).
1.1.3.2.1.1.1.3. Pro: [Bluetooth signal strength is influenced by whether or not the user carries the phone in their hand, their pocket or a bag](https://medium.com/personaldata-io/inferring-distance-from-bluetooth-signal-strength-a-deep-dive-fe7badc2bb6d).
1.1.3.2.2. Pro: A study has shown that the Bluetooth-based [Exposure notifications API](https://www.google.com/covid19/exposurenotifications/) embedded in Android [does not work reliably inside trams or buses](https://www.scss.tcd.ie/Doug.Leith/pubs/luas.pdf) \(p. 1\).
1.1.3.2.2.1. Pro: [The analysis](https://www.scss.tcd.ie/Doug.Leith/pubs/luas.pdf) showed that the rules governing exposure notifications of tracking apps are nearly random and therefore not very reliable.
1.1.3.2.3. Con: -> See 1.1.1.1.1.
1.1.3.3. Pro: Using a limited means to detect a complex phenomenon \(like virus transmission\) [will create a false sense of security.](https://ali-alkhatib.com/blog/digital-contact-tracing)
1.1.3.4. Pro: Not everyone has access to the modern blue-tooth technology in tracking apps. [This leads to systematic bias and a digital divide in health protection.](https://ali-alkhatib.com/blog/digital-contact-tracing)
1.1.4. Pro: Despite the fact tracking apps are in use in many countries now, there are no independent scientific studies [confirming](https://theconversation.com/contact-tracing-apps-theres-no-evidence-theyre-helping-stop-covid-19-148397) effectiveness.
1.1.4.1. Con: The use of tracking apps on this scale to contain the spread of a virus is unprecedented. It will take time before studies are able to be conclusively conducted.
1.1.4.2. Con: Computer models show tracking apps may be effective even at low adoption rates.
1.1.4.2.1. Pro: A [study](https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.08.29.20184135v1) found that even when the uptake of the app is low, the cumulative benefits of using tracking apps \(along with other precautionary measures\) are effective.
1.1.4.2.2. Pro: A [study](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2468266720301572) found that the use of contract tracing apps could reduce the effective reproduction number of COVID-19 to 0.8. Computer simulations comparing manual and automatic contact tracing indicated large gains for automatic tracing.
1.1.4.2.3. Con: Model studies have shown only limited capabilities to predict the effect of other measures, there is no reason why they should work for apps.
1.1.4.3. Pro: A recent metareview showed [real-life, empirical evidence is still lacking](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/landig/article/PIIS2589-7500\(20\)30184-9/fulltext).
1.1.4.4. Con: User [statistics show t](https://www.coronamelder.nl/media/Factsheet_Corona_latest.pdf)he working principle of detecting contaminated people who have no symptoms and were not identified by manual contact tracing works.
1.1.4.4.1. Con: The contribution of the CoronaMelder is modest at best, as only [10% of the detected cases](https://www.coronamelder.nl/media/Factsheet_Corona_latest.pdf) were preceded by a warning.
1.1.4.5. Pro: The Dutch medical authorities [published a study suggesting the app only contributed to a lowering of R of 0.3 percent compared to 6.4 percent for normal contact tracing and 6.0 due to testing policies](https://www.nu.nl/tech/6136246/coronamelder-app-liet-de-r-waarde-met-slechts-03-procent-dalen.html?redirect=1).
1.1.5. Con: -> See 1.1.4.2.1.
1.1.6. Pro: Then the effects of the apps are limited due to limited uptake.
1.1.6.1. Pro: The [elderly and homeless](https://www.politico.eu/article/scientists-cast-doubt-on-the-effectiveness-of-contact-tracing-apps/), who are more at risk of infection, are less likely to have phones that can run tracking apps. This undermines the efficacy of apps in preventing transmission.
1.1.6.1.1. Pro: A [survey](https://publichealth.jmir.org/2020/3/e20572/?utm_source=TrendMD&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=JMIR_TrendMD_1) found that the older a person, the less likely they were to perceive the tracing apps as beneficial.
1.1.6.2. Pro: The effectiveness of tracking apps is being limited by factors external to the app itself. These external problems should be fixed so that the apps can operate to their maximum effectiveness.
1.1.6.2.1. Pro: It is possible to effectively use tracking apps in preventing transmission if we can guarantee that a [significant proportion of the population](https://www.politico.eu/article/scientists-cast-doubt-on-the-effectiveness-of-contact-tracing-apps/) downloads and uses these apps.
1.1.6.2.1.1. Pro: A [study](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/landig/article/PIIS2589-7500\(20\)30184-9/fulltext) found that, with sufficient population uptake of tracing apps, transmission of COVID-19 would be reduced.
1.1.6.2.2. Pro: The development of apps has been [encumbered by](https://www.wired.com/story/why-contact-tracing-apps-not-slowed-covid-us/) haphazard logistics and political disorganization.
1.1.6.3. Pro: The Dutch corona app only accounted for [1.2% of the total number of registered infections](https://www.nu.nl/tech/6124903/coronamelder-haalt-in-lockdown-niet-veel-uit-is-erna-mogelijk-waardevoller.html) in the Netherlands.
1.1.6.3.1. Con: [Authorities claimed the app was less effective](https://www.nu.nl/tech/6124903/coronamelder-haalt-in-lockdown-niet-veel-uit-is-erna-mogelijk-waardevoller.html) than it could be due to lockdown measures \(and it will be effective once society is open again\)
1.1.6.3.2. Con: [1 in 3 people who tested after a warning were asymptomatic](https://www.nu.nl/tech/6124903/coronamelder-haalt-in-lockdown-niet-veel-uit-is-erna-mogelijk-waardevoller.html). Those people would not have been detected if the app didn't warn them.
1.1.6.3.2.1. Con: A proportion of these people could know anyway they were in contact with a contaminated person like a roommate.
1.1.6.3.3. Pro: Only 4 in 10 people getting a [warning from the CoronaMelder](https://www.nu.nl/tech/6123688/zeker-vier-op-de-tien-personen-vragen-test-aan-na-waarschuwing-coronamelder.html) asked for a test. Less than half self-quarantined.
1.2. Pro: Tracking apps may contain the spread of the virus and save lives.
1.2.1. Con: -> See 1.1.
1.2.2. Pro: People who receive a warning can isolate themselves. This decreases the chances of them spreading the virus to others.
1.2.3. Pro: China relied on [mass surveillance](https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-digital-contact-tracing-slowed-covid-19-in-east-asia) of phones to classify individuals by their health status and restrict their movements. This helped them contain the spread of the virus.
1.2.3.1. Con: China's mass surveillance efforts have not been wholeheartedly successful at keeping both the virus, and lockdowns, at bay. [Beijing](https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-54034809), for example, has been in and out of lockdowns for months
1.2.3.2. Pro: As of October 2020, China is considered to have [controlled](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099\(20\)30800-8/fulltext) the virus.
1.2.4. Pro: Containing the spread of the virus will allow us to turn back current precautionary measures such as lockdowns, as well as the harms associated with them.
1.2.4.1. Con: Governments that propagate tracking apps are unclear about the relative contribution of the apps to returning back to normal.
1.2.4.2. Pro: Tracking apps will allow people to know that they have come in contact with an infected person and take precautionary measures more quickly.
1.2.4.3. Pro: Many people, particularly the poor, suffer from the lockdown. Not introducing apps is violating their rights in society.
1.2.4.3.1. Pro: Lower income individuals are more likely to work in the service industry, which would benefit most from tracking apps, as shops and restaurants are more likely to be able to reopen.
1.2.4.4. Pro: Lifting the lockdown will ease the toll the lockdown has had on people's [mental health](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020764020927047).
1.2.4.4.1. Pro: When lockdown measures in the UK were lifted in early June, life satisfaction increased and stress and depression levels [decreased](https://b6bdcb03-332c-4ff9-8b9d-28f9c957493a.filesusr.com/ugd/3d9db5_6028d0aa0e004e5dae6536e7fc2ef280.pdf) among the population \(p. 2\).
1.2.5. Pro: Since it is difficult for the government to gain information on who all are infected, tracking apps are able to alleviate this information latency by giving users/the government an early warning so they can act sooner.
1.2.5.1. Pro: The information latency of contamination can be alleviated by introducing [predictive models](https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/09/how-we-feel-app-pilots-covid-prediction-model/) that need data.
1.2.6. Con: Many countries, such as [Norway and the UK](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/10/1006174/covid-contract-tracing-app-germany-ireland-success/), have abandoned their apps.
1.2.6.1. Pro: The large amounts of [time and money](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/10/1006174/covid-contract-tracing-app-germany-ireland-success/) that were invested in these apps were an inefficient use of resources.
1.2.6.1.1. Pro: New York's contact tracing app cost [$700,000](http://Contact-tracing apps: there’s no evidence they’re helping stop COVID-19), but only 5% of the state's population downloaded the app.
1.2.6.2. Con: The [UK](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/18/uk-poised-to-abandon-coronavirus-app-in-favour-of-apple-and-google-models) and [Norway](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-norway-apps-idUSKBN26J1YC) abandoned their initial efforts of an app, in favour of an alternative design.
1.2.6.2.1. Pro: The UK's abandonment of the initial app speaks not to the efficacy of the apps, but rather simply the efficacy of that design of app.
1.2.7. Con: The virus has already spread [throughout the world.](https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/03/30/822491838/coronavirus-world-map-tracking-the-spread-of-the-outbreak) At this point, its spread can no longer be contained and the tracking app is thus redundant.
1.3. Con: Governments have used the pandemic as a cover to enforce state policies, such as tracking apps, that undermine democracy.
1.3.1. Pro: Decisions taken in crisis time will not be turned back after the crisis is over.
1.3.1.1. Con: There is no compelling evidence that there is a plan to continue or to expand tracking after the crisis is over.
1.3.1.2. Con: Legal measures could ensure that tracking apps would only be legal during a defined COVID-19 crisis period.
1.3.1.2.1. Pro: [Sunset clauses](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/social-policy/health/coronavirus-bill-what-is-the-sunset-clause-provision/) are already commonly used to reduce the effect of legislation or eliminate it entirely.
1.3.1.2.1.1. Pro: There is a sunset clause in the US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, so millions of people will lose their tax cut in [2025](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax_Cuts_and_Jobs_Act_of_2017#Individual_income_tax).
1.3.1.2.1.2. Pro: The UK Parliament has passed [emergency Coronavirus legislation](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-52004116). The legislation contains a sunset clause, according to which the Act will expire after a period of [two years.](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/7/section/89)
1.3.1.2.1.2.1. Pro: The Parliament must also [review](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/7/section/98) the Act every six months to ensure its legality and continued necessity.
1.3.1.2.1.3. Pro: The Health Act 2020 in Ireland was set to expire on [9 November 2020](http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2020/act/1/section/2/enacted/en/html), unless its continuation was approved by both Houses of the Oireachtas. The legislation expired at the due date, a committee was held, and the deadline [subsequently extended](https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2020-10-22/17/) to 9th June 2021.
1.3.1.2.1.4. Pro: Scotland's emergency COVID-19 legislature contains a [sunset clause](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-52092081) that causes the legislation to expire after six months unless an extension is approved by the MSPs.
1.3.1.2.2. Pro: Like wartime policies, radical policies that are taken to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, are likely to be temporary measures.
1.3.1.2.2.1. Pro: Ireland created emergency legislation during World War 2, and this expired in [1946](http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1945/act/26/enacted/en/print).
1.3.1.3. Con: While tracking applications could likely be justified in a time of unprecedented crisis, it is likely that the policy would lose legitimacy in a non-crisis period.
1.3.1.3.1. Pro: In democracies, those in power are likely to be sensitive to public opinion as the public has the constitutional right to vote their rulers out of power during the next election cycle.
1.3.1.3.2. Pro: People might think it's legitimate for governments to have such invasive policies during times of a global pandemic. This does not mean that people are likely to simply cooperate when states implement privacy-violating policies in the future when such exceptional cirumstances are not present.
1.3.1.4. Pro: Some laws that were [initially introduced as temporary](https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/top-10-temporary-things-that-turned-out-to-be-permanent-a8421381.html) measures are permanent laws today.
1.3.1.5. Pro: The collected data might be used for other purposes once the virus outbreak is over, putting our freedom at risk.
1.3.1.6. Con: Each measure taken could be created set to automatically expire.
1.3.1.6.1. Con: Governments are unlikely to respect the expiry of measures.
1.3.1.6.1.1. Con: The way sunset clauses are written they automatically expire unless the government has another vote to renew them. They have a limited amount of time to achieve anything, and each renewal brings another opportunity for their constituents to provide further input.
1.3.1.6.2. Pro: -> See 1.3.1.2.1.
1.3.1.7. Con: Any legislature that is retained past the crisis can be reverted if people elect the political party prioritizing this reversion.
1.3.1.8. Pro: Once states have rolled out surveillance technologies, they are unlikely to stop taking advantage of them in ordinary times.
1.3.1.8.1. Pro: Many of the regulations installed after 9/11 are [still in place](https://www.ballardspahr.com/eventsnews/mediacoverage/2016-09-09-five-laws-and-regulations-that-emerged-from-9-11).
1.3.2. Pro: Governments have struggled and been unable to find proper legal backing for using tracking apps.
1.3.2.1. Pro: The Dutch government has [tried to obtain location data](https://nos.nl/artikel/2333090-de-jonge-wil-telecomwet-wijzigen-om-coronadata-te-verzamelen.html) from phone providers to help fight the pandemic \(unlawfully\). A government that is unable to respect existing privacy regulations, cannot be trusted to use the data of tracking apps for the sole purpose of fighting the pandemic.
1.3.2.1.1. Con: Since the initial proposal, the Dutch government has gone out of its way to minimize and respond to privacy concerns while building the app. This willingness to forego data accumulation as much as possible demonstrates that the government has only the benefit of the people in mind.
1.3.2.1.1.1. Pro: The "[Program of Requirements](https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-app/documenten/publicaties/2020/05/19/programma-van-eisen)" for tracing apps [emphasizes](https://blogdroiteuropeen.com/2020/07/28/covid-19-data-protection-in-the-netherlands-contact-tracing-app-and-automated-collection-of-location-data-by-raphael-gellert/) data minimization and decentralized tracing technology,
1.3.2.1.1.2. Pro: CoronaMelder is [open-source](https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-app/vraag-en-antwoord/hoe-zorgt-de-overheid-ervoor-dat-de-corona-app-veilig-is), allowing people to observe and contribute to its development.
1.3.2.1.1.3. Con: The App and corresponding legislation has been rejected several times by the authorities. The final version is still c[ritically reviewed by privacy watchers.](https://www.bitsoffreedom.nl/2020/10/09/moet-je-de-coronamelder-installeren-of-niet/)
1.3.2.1.2. Con: The Dutch government's responsible handling of the concerns raised by people has engendered a sizable interest among the Dutch public.
1.3.2.1.2.1. Pro: A study found that [more than half](https://nltimes.nl/2020/04/30/majority-dutch-willing-use-safe-coronavirus-tracking-app-study) of the residents of the Netherlands were willing to download the tracking app.
1.3.2.1.2.1.1. Con: Actual downloads were only [15%](https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2020/10/at-least-2-2-million-people-have-downloaded-the-dutch-coronavirus-app/) of the population.
1.3.2.1.2.2. Con: There is no evidence of the app preventing actual contaminations.
1.3.2.1.2.3. Con: Downloads do not equate use. Users need to have the app running in the background and their bluetooth on. So the actual usage rate is expected to be much lower than the download rate.
1.3.2.1.2.4. Con: The government incentivized those who downloaded testing apps with the promise of extending[testing for app-users who were asymptomatic](https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2020/06/25/corona-app-werkt-vooral-bij-veel-testen-op-het-virus-a4004146). However, testing capacity was not enough to live up to this promise, diminishing public trust in the app.
1.3.2.2. Pro: Tracking apps by governments violate The Bill of Rights.
1.3.2.2.1. Pro: A tracing app allows governments to monitor activities of individuals with no reasonable grounds, which is prohibited by the [Fourth Amendment.](https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/10007-would-covid-19-digital-contact-tracing-programs)
1.3.2.2.2. Pro: Limiting the privacy of all citizens of the US through tracking apps conflicts with the [Tenth Amendment](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/tenth_amendment), according to which such powers \(i.e. ones not delegated to the US through the Constitution\) are reserved for individual states.
1.3.2.3. Pro: Portugal was [initially hesitant](https://www.portugalresident.com/portugal-rejects-tech-plan-for-contact-tracing-of-citizens-during-pandemic/) about using contact apps because the government believed they were unconstitutional.
1.3.2.3.1. Pro: Portugal's attempt to make the apps mandatory was met with [widespread criticism](https://www.businessinsider.com/the-latest-portugal-backs-away-from-mandatory-tracing-app-2020-10), highlighting the lack of support and unconstitutionality of the measure.
1.3.3. Pro: The right to choice and privacy, which are guaranteed in democratic countries, are undermined by this legislation.
1.3.3.1. Pro: Tracking apps violate the [4th Amendment](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment) of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits the government from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures.
1.3.3.1.1. Con: Privacy is a personal value and, as such, cannot outweigh the public benefits of tracking apps
1.3.3.1.2. Con: 4th amendment rights apply to [governmental actions](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fourth_amendment). The tracking applications being proposed are from technology companies not acting directly under the supervision of the government. The 4th amendment is not implicated here.
1.3.3.2. Con: [In most countries, the use of tracking apps is not mandatory](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-covid-tracing-tracker/). Therefore, people's right to choose will not be compromised.
1.3.3.2.1. Con: Singapore intends on making its COVID-19 tracking app [mandatory](https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2020/11/hong-kong-introduces-a-contact-tracing-app-2/) by the end of 2020.
1.3.3.2.2. Pro: If the government is not forcing the use of apps upon people, then they still have full freedom of choice. It is unlikely that this would change going forward.
1.3.3.2.3. Con: Even though the Dutch Corona App is voluntary, 62.7% of the users [feel an obligation to use the app](https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/current/news/more-news/coronamelder-nynke-van-der-laan-less-used-young-adults-intention-follow-advice-high).
1.3.4. Con: Temporarily undermining democracy is a small price to pay to ensure the health and safety of the population.
1.4. Pro: Tracking apps empower responsible citizens to help fight the virus.
1.4.1. Con: Tracking apps disempower citizens since they amplify social anxiety and distrust of others around them.
1.4.1.1. Con: People might feel much safer if they know that if they were in contact with an infected person, they would be notified.
1.4.1.1.1. Pro: Due to the possibility for asymptomatic transmission of COVID-19, the [fear of not knowing](https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/mandy_wiener/mandy-wiener-do-i-or-dont-i-the-fear-of-not-knowing-is-driving-me-mad-20200714) whether one has the virus is a challenge for people.
1.4.1.1.1.1. Pro: Several neurobiological studies and theories posit [the fear of the unknown](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0887618516300469#sec0095) as fundamental to other fears and anxieties.
1.4.1.1.2. Pro: People would feel safer interacting with people around them if they are certain that sick people are tracked and quarantined.
1.4.1.1.3. Pro: The fear of infecting loved ones, because you have been infected, would be significantly reduced.
1.4.1.2. Pro: Infected people may be identifiable through tracking apps, which could heighten the anxiety of someone who is infected.
1.4.1.2.1. Pro: Tracking applications run the risk of stigmatizing even those people who were taking necessary precautions but got infected because of negligence on the part of others.
1.4.1.2.1.1. Con: Tracking apps [do not reveal](https://cpg.doc.ic.ac.uk/blog/evaluating-contact-tracing-apps-here-are-8-privacy-questions-we-think-you-should-ask/) the identity of the person who is infected to the general public or to people who may have been infected by them.
1.4.1.2.1.2. Con: [Minimal information](https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/11/21216803/apple-google-coronavirus-tracking-app-covid-bluetooth-secure) is utilized by tracking apps to avoid sensitive information that could easily identify a person from being recorded.
1.4.1.2.1.2.1. Pro: [Private Automated Contact Tracing](https://www.cnet.com/news/coronavirus-app-could-trace-your-contacts-without-sacrificing-your-privacy/), or PACT, uses Bluetooth to determine who has come into contact with an infected person and makes them aware of this without sharing the identity or phone number of the infected person.
1.4.1.2.2. Pro: Those infected may face social and [legal](https://www.kfyrtv.com/2020/12/03/hawaii-couple-arrested-after-getting-on-a-plane-knowing-they-were-covid-positive/) issues once identified \(such as receive directed anger, be ostracized \(even after getting well\), become victims of [scams](https://www.newsweek.com/teen-covid-19-patient-raped-bogus-paramedic-1530393), etc.\). This can become a safety hazard to those infected \(or even potentially infected\) and others near them.
1.4.1.2.2.1. Pro: Those who have been suspected of having the disease have been [assaulted](https://abc7chicago.com/cta-bus-attack-nurse-punched/6074852/) before. An app may likely increase violence towards many suspected individuals \(regardless of whether they have the disease or not\) and bring even more severe violence to those who actually are ill.
1.4.1.2.3. Pro: Some people may crave privacy and tracking apps are a [severe intrusion](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563217304284?via%3Dihub) of that. For these people, a violation of their desired privacy could give them anxiety \(especially if they want to hide parts of their life from the public\).
1.4.1.2.4. Pro: The possibility that people don't choose to participate in being tracked would give them anxiety and fear over that and of having their life controlled.
1.4.1.2.5. Pro: Even if the tracking app is anonymous, it's not going to be able to always hide anonymity. These days, it's really easy to track individuals via [social media](https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/behind-global-efforts-make-privacy-first-coronavirus-tracking-app-n1177871) and other means.
1.4.1.2.5.1. Con: All major contact tracing apps were designed by security and privacy experts that explicitly make this nightmarish scenario [avoidable](https://techxplore.com/news/2020-04-coronavirus-tracking-app-privacy.html).
1.4.1.3. Pro: Having the feeling that one is constantly watched is likely to worsen people's anxiety.
1.4.1.3.1. Pro: Those with social anxiety often experience [symptoms](https://anxietynetwork.com/content/least-understood-anxiety-disorder) of fear about being observed and judged by others.
1.4.1.4. Con: If people do not get a warning, they know they are safe. This is likely to decrease anxiety among people.
1.4.1.4.1. Con: [Complacency](https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/11/1077722) can lead to riskier behaviors and more socialization, which could lead to an uptick in cases.
1.4.1.4.2. Pro: If people feel safer and more comfortable when conducting journeys that they would have to do anyway, this decreases people's anxiety.
1.4.2. Pro: Tracking apps enable people to [self-quarantine](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa) when they have been put at risk.
1.4.2.1. Pro: Tracking apps may help encourage people to self-quarantine, knowing that others will be using the app for similar reasons. Thus, they may view self-quarantine as a collective action taken by responsible citizens.
1.4.2.2. Con: Given people and organizations alike are unsure of the [efficacy](https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52353720) of these apps, they may not listen to the advice of the apps.
1.4.2.2.1. Pro: In the Netherlands companies are not allowed to pressure their employees to use the app .
1.4.2.2.2. Con: Many companies have been advising their workers [against using the apps](https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2020/11/employers-advising-workers-to-switch-off-corona-app/) for fear of excessive absences due to workers self-quarantining.
1.4.3. Pro: Tracking apps enable people with COVID to notify others silently [through notifications](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/nhs-covid-19-app-track-trace-how-work-download-now-phone/), without having to be ashamed or embarrassed of their illness.
1.4.3.1. Con: Under UK and European data protection laws, the government-backed tracking application in the UK [does not qualify as anonymous](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/nhs-covid-app-data-anonymous) because 'personal data' constitutes anything that can be used to identify an individual.
1.4.3.1.1. Pro: The NHSX app [does not preserve](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/nhs-covid-app-data-anonymous) the anonymity of users, as it primarily processes pseudonymous personal data.
1.4.3.2. Pro: The German [Corona Warn App](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/corona-warn-app/corona-warn-app-englisch) allows infected users to anonymously notify others about an infection.
1.4.3.3. Pro: There is a [social stigma](https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2020.00429/full) associated with having COVID-19. Apps circumvent the need to out oneself to close contacts, and so allow people to avoid harmful social stigma.
1.4.4. Con: It is possible that trolls might falsely register themselves as ill in the tracking apps, making the data being given to the app unreliable.
1.4.4.1. Con: The potential for trolls is true for all applications that interact with people. This does not undermine the utility of the app in the vast majority of cases.
1.4.4.2. Pro: Trolls would generate lots of false positives: people warned about having COVID-19 without having it. This can seriously undermine trust.
1.4.4.3. Con: States can make it such that a positive COVID-19 diagnosis in the app can only be approved by an official source.
1.4.4.3.1. Pro: This implemented in this way in many existing COVID apps.
1.4.4.3.1.1. Pro: [Canada](https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/video/covid-alert.html)'s COVID alert app only allows users to input a positive COVID-19 diagnosis with a one time passcode, provided by health authorities when one receives a positive test result.
1.4.4.3.1.2. Pro: Each person who tests positive in [Ireland](https://www2.hse.ie/conditions/coronavirus/covid-tracker-app/using-the-covid-tracker-app-if-you-test-positive.html) is provided with a unique key to input into the COVID tracker app.
1.4.5. Pro: Tracking apps allow citizens to provide their governments with vital information about the virus.
1.4.5.1. Pro: People can help normal contact tracing by [handing over their contacts](https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/tech/artikel/5135056/ontwerp-corona-app-nederland-design-github) to the authorities when they get infected.
1.4.5.2. Pro: Data from tracking apps can be used to [do Big-Data analytics](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa) to monitor \(and predict\) the spread of the virus.
1.4.5.3. Pro: Data from tracking apps can be used to [identify hot-spots](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa) in the spread of the virus.
1.4.5.4. Con: Citizens can provide their governments with information about the virus without the need for tracking apps.
1.4.5.4.1. Pro: Citizens can help manual [contact tracing](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/contact-tracing/contact-tracing-plan/contact-tracing.html#anchor_159001196) efforts by providing officials with a list of their close contacts.
1.4.5.4.2. Con: People may be uncooperative, and choose not to disclose information voluntarily.
1.4.5.4.3. Con: Collecting information on such a massive scale without using these apps would be time consuming and labour-intensive.
1.4.6. Con: Tracking apps can help the government [enforce social distancing measures](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa). Since states are forcing citizens to follow these measures, citizens are not the ones empowered to fight the virus.
1.4.7. Pro: Many tracking apps also provide a [secondary function](https://mhealth.jmir.org/2020/9/e19796/) such as providing education, symptom advice, and small number even offer online consultations.
1.4.7.1. Pro: [Government-backed information](https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/government-resources-workplace-issues-coronavirus.aspx) tends to be the least biased information on COVID-19, and so sending it directly to the citizens via an app avoids the spin of the media.
1.4.7.1.1. Pro: Misinformation regarding COVID-19 [has cost](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/covid-misinformation-is-killing-people1/) many people their lives. Unbiased and accurate information distributes through these apps could help counter the effect of misinformation.
1.4.7.2. Con: These functions could all be provided by apps without a tracking function.
1.4.8. Pro: The app could be a life-saver at zero cost. Not using it is simply a display of a lack of solidarity with fellow citizens.
1.4.8.1. Pro: The pandemic has made many people [feel powerless](https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20201209-how-to-restore-your-sense-of-control-when-you-feel-powerless). The apps are one way in which they can regain control and do their part.
1.5. Pro: Tracking apps are the least invasive measure.
1.5.1. Pro: Compared to other COVID-19 prevention methods such as social distancing, tracking apps do not limit people in their freedom of action.
1.5.1.1. Con: These apps are only effective when coupled with policies that would limit people's freedom of action, such as isolation for those who have been exposed to an infected person.
1.5.1.2. Pro: Individuals are able to [choose](https://www2.hse.ie/conditions/coronavirus/covid-tracker-app/privacy-and-how-we-use-your-data.html) whether or not they want to share their data.
1.5.2. Con: The problems with privacy and data safety concerns around tracking apps are hidden costs which are not immediately apparent and hard to compare.
1.5.2.1. Pro: -> See 1.4.1.
1.5.3. Con: There are many other measures that can be taken in lieu of tracking apps.
1.5.3.1. Pro: On their own, lockdowns are an effective measure for slowing the spread of the virus.
1.5.3.1.1. Pro: A [study](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352914820305700) found that a lockdown could successfully flatten the curve in Saudi Arabia.
1.5.3.1.2. Pro: Many countries are using tracking apps as a reason [to lift lockdowns](https://www.france24.com/en/20200415-eu-looks-to-apps-as-way-of-easing-virus-lockdown).
1.5.3.2. Pro: Nearly [61 million cases](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2404-8) of COVID-19 were avoided due to anti-contagion policies implemented across 6 countries.
1.5.3.3. Pro: [Manual contact tracing could have been supported much better by electronic systems](https://interactions.acm.org/blog/view/the-best-tech-for-contact-tracing-systems-designed-for-healthcare-workers). It would have been better to invest in improving this technology than in the alternative of digital contact tracing.
1.5.4. Pro: Tracking apps are the most cost-effective means of fighting COVID-19.
1.5.4.1. Pro: Many measures to combat Covid-19 require ongoing public expenditure, like [economic supports](https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/What-We-Do/Supports-for-SMEs/COVID-19-supports/) to help businesses through lockdowns. After the initial research and development costs, tracking apps would be relatively inexpensive.
1.5.4.1.1. Pro: Ireland's tracking app has been lauded as a success, and it cost only [€850,000.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/20/cheap-popular-and-it-works-irelands-contact-tracing-app-success)
1.5.4.2. Con: The costs for developing and running the [UK tracking app](https://fullfact.org/online/ireland-uk-tracing-app/) will exceed £25 million.
1.5.4.2.1. Con: The costs get outweight by the billions in damage caused by the pandamic.
1.6. Con: The danger of COVID-19 is inflated by the media, leading to disproportional measures such as tracking apps.
1.6.1. Pro: COVID-19 is no different than other easily communicable diseases such as TB and AIDS and thus does not merit a grander response.
1.6.1.1. Pro: Like COVID-19, AIDS is [transmissible](https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/about-hiv-and-aids/how-is-hiv-transmitted) between humans. AIDS has been killing millions of people for 30 years. If we still do not have a StopAIDS app in our phones, even though we have the technology to develop it now, we don't need to have the StopCOVID app.
1.6.1.1.1. Con: A StopAIDS-app would not make sense because it is not possible to automatically track contacts that are relevant for the transmission of AIDS.
1.6.1.1.1.1. Pro: Sexual contacts cannot be automatically tracked via a phone.
1.6.1.1.1.2. Pro: Blood transfers cannot be automatically tracked via a phone.
1.6.1.2. Con: Neither AIDS nor tuberculosis share the spreading characteristics that make COVID-19 so dangerous.
1.6.1.2.1. Pro: The transmission path of AIDS is not comparable to that of COVID-19 since [AIDS isn't transferred through people's breath](https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/understanding-hiv-aids/fact-sheets/20/48/the-basics-of-hiv-prevention#:~:text=People%20can%20get%20or%20transmit,vaginal%20fluids%2C%20and%20breast%20milk.).
1.6.1.2.1.1. Con: Transmission paths exist for AIDS too. It is the mode of transmission that differs: sexual contacts instead of droplets from the breath.
1.6.1.2.1.1.1. Con: It is easier to reduce and track sexual contacts, in comparison to reducing and tracking contacts who are simply people nearby.
1.6.1.2.1.2. Pro: COVID-19 can easily spread through close [person-to-person contact](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html). However, [AIDS](https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/understanding-hiv-aids/fact-sheets/20/48/the-basics-of-hiv-prevention#:~:text=People%20can%20get%20or%20transmit,vaginal%20fluids%2C%20and%20breast%20milk) does not easily spread that way.
1.6.1.2.2. Pro: Tuberculosis is less dangerous than COVID-19 because, even though it is highly contagious when in an active state of the disease, [patients infected with tuberculosis in the "latent" phase are not infective before developing symptoms](https://www.cdc.gov/tb/topic/basics/tbinfectiondisease.htm).
1.6.1.2.3. Con: Both [AIDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epidemiology_of_HIV/AIDS) and [Tuberculosis](https://www.tballiance.org/why-new-tb-drugs/global-pandemic) are dangerous diseases with higher lethality rates than COVID-19.
1.6.1.2.4. Pro: The fact that neither AIDS nor tuberculosis have overburdened medical systems proves that they are less destructive than COVID-19.
1.6.1.2.5. Pro: The [R number](https://www.bbc.com/news/health-52473523#:~:text=The%20R%20number%20is%20a) of COVID-19 is [estimated](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099\(20\)30840-9/fulltext) to be between 2 and 3, while the R number of [tuberculosis](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6092233/#!po=21.1538) is usually below this.
1.6.1.3. Con: Tuberculosis is a [notifiable disease](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Notifiable_disease#:~:text=A%20notifiable%20disease%20is%20any,early%20warning%20of%20possible%20outbreaks) which needs to be reported to health authorities in many countries. Nationwide tracking of infectious diseases is a common practice in these countries.
1.6.1.3.1. Con: Even though Tuberculosis is nationally traced, it doesn't [involve mass surveillance](https://bmjopenrespres.bmj.com/content/5/1/e000341).
1.6.1.4. Con: The geographical distribution of tuberculosis and COVID-19 vary and therefore require different responses in different countries. The US, for instance, saw over [12 million cases of COVID-19](https://www.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases) so far compared to [8,920 cases of TB in 2019](https://www.cdc.gov/tb/statistics/default.htm). This can justify large scale tracking of COVID-19 spread and not of tuberculosis infections.
1.6.2. Pro: Apps are favored over real solutions because they are mediagenetic i.e. an easy way to generate media attention, showing how “modern” we are.
1.6.2.1. Pro: In a crisis situation the focus should be on proven solutions rather than novel gadgets.
1.6.2.1.1. Con: The Covid-19 pandemic itself is a novel challenge, and there is no reason why technology cannot be part of the solution to it.
1.6.2.2. Pro: Scientist [have warned governments against](http://allai.nl/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Online-versie-Brief-Minister-President-Rutte-Ministers-De-Jonge-Van-Rijn-Grapperhaus-de-heer-Sijbesma-inzake-COVID-19-tracking-en-tracing-en-gezondheidsapps.pdf) 'solutionism', t[he idea that there is a technolocial fix for everything](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/buzzword/entries/solutionism.html).
1.6.2.3. Con: The working principles behind the app extend the 'proven' approach of contact tracing.
1.6.2.3.1. Pro: In the 1950s, contact tracing was [successfully utilized](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/372541) to limit the spread of syphilis.
1.6.2.3.2. Pro: Contact tracing has [successfully been utilized](https://www.thebodypro.com/article/what-is-hiv-contact-tracing-and-why-is-it-importan) to control the spread of AIDS.
1.6.3. Con: Media attention is reflective of the seriousness of the virus because media establishments must protect the [public interest.](https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/the-public-interest)
1.6.3.1. Pro: The media attention for COVID-19 [increased](https://mediacloud.org/news/2020/3/22/information-pandemic-initial-explorations-of-covid-19-coverage) as the number of cases did. The increase in cases indicated the increased seriousness and danger of the virus.
1.6.3.2. Pro: Despite [not being well-versed](https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/05/06/covid-19-and-the-media-the-role-of-journalism-in-a-global-pandemic/) in public health reporting, journalists have worked tirelessly to report on the pandemic because it is a necessary and much-needed subject to report on.
1.6.3.3. Con: The media runs COVID-19 related news from an emotional and biased perspective. It is the [number of clicks](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-34213693) that dictate the title.
1.6.4. Con: Searches for COVID-19 [have increased](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7459752/) since the onset of the virus, indicating public interest in the issue. The media must follow and report on what the public is interested in.
1.6.4.1. Con: The relationship between the media and public interest is cyclical, insofar as the public would not have known of the pandemic to begin with if not for media reporting.
1.6.5. Pro: Because of the perceived danger of COVID, critical media coverage is deemed harmful for public health, resulting in self-censorship of the media.
1.6.5.1. Con: In talk-shows, experts are often paired with skeptics as if they represent two equal sides of a debate, leading to under- rather than over-representation of risks. Real knowledge is unjustly equated with mere opinion.
1.6.6. Con: The media is not providing enough coverage for the many aspects of the pandemic.
1.6.6.1. Pro: Initial media coverage of COVID-19 was [low and dismissive](https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/13/21214114/media-coronavirus-pandemic-coverage-cdc-should-you-wear-masks) of the seriousness of the virus.
1.6.6.2. Pro: There are many critiques on the seriousness of COVID-19 and the \(in\)effectiveness of certain measures that do no get massive attention of the media.
1.6.6.2.1. Con: The seriousness of COVID-19 can not be determined by the number of critiques or the media, but only by observing data and the facts, which points to COVID19 as one of the most dangerous pandemics humanity has ever faced.
1.6.6.2.2. Pro: The media has [not been giving enough attention](https://ldi.upenn.edu/news/threat-covid-vaccine-hesitancy-getting-enough-attention) to the dangers posed by vaccine hesitancy in controlling and ending the pandemic.
1.6.7. Pro: “The media [exaggerates negative news](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/17/steven-pinker-media-negative-news). This distortion has consequences \[...\] Whether or not the COVID situation is worse, the nature of news will interact with the nature of cognition to make us think that it is.
1.6.8. Con: Hyper-inflating newscasts would be corrected by the tracking apps, as people would verify the numbers rather than vice versa.
1.6.8.1. Con: With paranoia and people distrusting those around them, people may not double check the tracking apps \(possibly because they're not able to\). So the tracking apps may spread the hyper-inflation rather than decrease it.
1.7. Con: Tracking applications compromise the privacy of people.
1.7.1. Con: -> See 1.3.3.1.1.
1.7.2. Con: In general, privacy considerations have been central to the efforts to design tracking apps for COVID-19.
1.7.2.1. Con: The current approach to privacy is inadequate. Users should be able to set privacy control themselves instead of being forced to accept the ones imposed on them by a singular tracking app.
1.7.2.2. Pro: Apps with a [Bluetooth plan](https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/10/21216484/google-apple-coronavirus-contract-tracing-bluetooth-location-tracking-data-app) wouldn’t track people’s physical location. It would basically pick up the signals of nearby phones at 5-minute intervals and store the connections between them in a database.
1.7.2.2.1. Con: Tracing social contacts is also a form of surveyance.
1.7.2.3. Pro: Frequent transmissions between the devices of users and the servers [generate metadata](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/rating-privacy-protections-state-covid-19-tracking-apps) that can typically be used to reveal the user's location. To protect users from this breach, states in the US are instituting privacy policies to discard of IP addresses or to dissociate them from specific users.
1.7.2.4. Con: Human contact is central to group identity which is in turn very sensitive information [taken outside of the context of the COVID-19 pandemic the technology could be used to track other minority groups.](https://ali-alkhatib.com/blog/digital-contact-tracing)
1.7.3. Con: Tracking apps provide an opportunity for the development of technologies that are truly privacy sensitive by design.
1.7.3.1. Pro: Apple and Google have announced novel bluetooth protocols [to support](https://venturebeat.com/2020/04/13/what-privacy-preserving-coronavirus-tracing-apps-need-to-succeed/) bluetooth contact tracing.
1.7.3.1.1. Con: Corona-apps stimulate certain technology developments. So although tracking technologies in use can be made more privacy-sensitive, this feature will be added to more and more applications.
1.7.3.2. Pro: It's easier to [get funding](https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252491221/Privacy-and-online-safety-are-focus-of-new-UKRI-research-funding) for such research at the moment.
1.7.4. Con: People should not be concerned about this if they have nothing to hide.
1.7.4.1. Con: The reasons why people have to hide something are not important. In order to be truly free, individuals need to be able to decide what information they want to share and with whom they want to share it.
1.7.4.1.1. Pro: As history shows, without the right to privacy, there is much more space for oppression.
1.7.4.1.1.1. Pro: The lack of a [right to privacy](https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/From%20oppression%20to%20liberation-reclaiming%20the%20right%20to%20privacy.pdf) has historically shown to harm women's lives.
1.7.4.2. Pro: If people are not engaging in suspicious activities, their data cannot be adversely used against them.
1.7.5. Pro: -> See 1.3.3.
1.7.6. Pro: A [study](https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2021-02/qmuo-ntr022521.php) in February 2021 that assessed 40 Covid-19 contact tracing apps found that 72.5% of the apps used at least one insecure cryptographic algorithm.
1.7.6.1. Pro: They [further found](https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2021-02/qmuo-ntr022521.php) that three-fourth of apps contained at least one tracker that reported information to third parties such as Facebook Analytics or Google Firebase.
1.7.7. Pro: Applications in general are not secure. We should not trust them with even more personal information, especially on such a massive scale.
1.7.7.1. Con: People with modern smart phones or social media profiles are constantly being tracked already. This app does not make it worse.
1.7.7.1.1. Pro: Secret services like the NSA track all of us and our communications, as best as they can.
1.7.7.1.1.1. Pro: According to Edward Snowden, the NSA is gathering nearly [5 billion](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_story.html) records a day on the whereabouts of cellphones around the world.
1.7.7.1.2. Pro: Google and Facebook track people through various mechanisms.
1.7.7.1.2.1. Pro: [Google](https://medium.com/swlh/an-in-depth-look-into-all-the-ways-google-tracks-you-in-2019-b158acf05b29) tracks you throughout the Internet.
1.7.7.1.2.2. Pro: Google [tracks](https://apnews.com/828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb/AP-Exclusive:-Google-tracks-your-movements,-like-it-or-not) your phone usage, your location, your browsing behavior on your phone.
1.7.7.1.2.3. Pro: [Facebook](https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-tracking-internet-safety-security-privacy-mark-zuckerberg-latest-a8308446.html) tracks your every step throughout the net.
1.7.7.1.3. Con: If tracking people is undesirable, we should limit tracking technologies not make it worse by adding more.
1.7.7.1.4. Con: Contact tracking is different than tracking people on the web.
1.7.7.1.5. Con: Being monitored by private organizations is not as bad as being tracked by the government.
1.7.7.1.6. Pro: Location data is already shared with governments in [anonymized way](https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/coronavirus-telekom-uebergibt-zweiten-handydatensatz-ans-robert-koch-institut-a-b1659a1f-7715-41d3-9c7a-685512940090).
1.7.7.1.6.1. Con: An [MIT study](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8470173) has shown people can be identified even if these datasets are anonymous.
1.7.7.1.6.2. Con: When the Dutch government requested location data from mobile providers to help it combat the coronavirus, it was declared [illegal](https://www.nu.nl/tech/6041969/toezichthouder-locatiedata-verzamelen-in-strijd-tegen-coronavirus-is-illegaal.html?redirect=1).
1.7.7.1.7. Con: Generally, people consent to giving up their location and other pieces of data when using certain mobile applications. If the state compels the use of tracking applications, this is a distinct issue as people lose their ability to consent.
1.7.7.1.8. Pro: If people are willing to give away their data to get free services, it is not to much to ask them to give it for public health.
1.7.7.1.9. Pro: The institutions behind the app have an urgent reason to track people and have no concrete plans to keep on doing this.
1.7.7.2. Pro: Even [tech giants](https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2018/10/why-your-online-data-isnt-safe/), who have invested the most in data security, have been the victims of data breaches.
1.7.7.3. Con: Many tracking apps save data only [locally](https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app). Local storage is [harder](https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/19/cell-phones-a-harder-hack-target-than-computers-fireeyes-president-says.html) to hack.
1.7.7.4. Pro: -> See 1.4.1.2.5.